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Recent Developments 
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rei. 
Stevens: 
A Private Individual May Not Bring Suit in Federal Court on Behalf of the United 
States Against a State Under the False Claims Act 
The Supreme Court of the United States held that a 
private individual may not bring a suit 
in federal court on behalf of the United 
States against a State or state agency 
under the False Claims Act ("FCA"). 
Vermont Agency of Natural 
Resources v. United States ex rei. 
Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000). In 
so holding, the Court found that a 
State or state agency is not a "person" 
subject to FCA's qui tam' provision. 
Furthermore, while the Court 
immunized States from lawsuits under 
the FCA, a private individual has 
standing to bring an action against 
"any person" in federal court on behalf 
of the United States. 
Respondent Jonathan Stevens 
("Stevens") alleged that the Vermont 
Agency of Natural Resources 
("Agency"), his former employer, 
submitted false claims to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency 
("EPA") in connection with federal 
grant programs. Stevens alleged that 
the Agency overstated the amount of 
time spent by its employees on the 
federally funded projects, defrauding 
the federal government of more grant 
money than the Agency was entitled 
to receive. 
Stevens brought a qui tam 
action in the United States District 
Court for the District of Vermont 
By Scott H. Arney 
against the Agency. The Agency filed 
a motion to dismiss, arguing that a 
State or state agency is not a "person" 
and thus not subject to liability under 
the FCA. In addition, the Agency 
contended that the Eleventh 
Amendment bars a qui tam action 
against a State. The district court 
denied the agency's motion. 
Thereafter, the Agency filed an 
interlocutory appeal and the district 
court stayed further proceedings 
pending its outcome. The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed the district court's decision. 
The Suprem~ Court granted a writ of 
certiorari to determine if a private 
person has Article ill standing to bring 
such a suit, whether the action against 
the state is barred by the 11th 
Amendment, and if a State is 
considered a "person" under the qui 
tam statute, and if so, whether the 
State is immune from suit. 
The Court began its analysis by 
examining the FCA's history. ld at 
1860. The FCA imposes civil liability 
upon "any person" who "knowingly 
presents, or causes to be presented, 
to any officer or employee of the 
United States Government ... a false 
or fraudulent claim for payment or 
approval." /d. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 
3729(a) (1994)). The defendant in 
such an action may be liable for up to 
treble damages and a civil penalty up 
to $10,000 per false claim. /d. In 
addition, a false claim action can be 
brought by either the federal 
government or a private person, also 
known as a relator. /d. In cases in 
which the relator initiates the action, 
he/she is entitled to receive a share 
of any of the proceeds that are 
recovered, including any amount 
received in a settlement or judgment, 
plus attorney's fees and costs. /d. at 
1861 (citing31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) 
& (2) (1994)). 
Next, the Court addressed the 
jurisdictional question of whether 
Stevens had standing under the U.S. 
Constitution, art. ill, section 2, clause 
1. /d. at 1861. The Court found 
that there are three requirements for 
standing to be established: ( 1) the 
moving party must establish "injury 
in fact," that is, a harm that is both 
"concrete" and "actual or imminent, 
not conjectural or hypothetical." /d. 
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 
U.S. 149, 155 (1990)); (2) there 
must be causation, and "a fairly ... 
trace[ able]" connection between the 
injury in fact and the alleged conduct. 
/d. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. 
Welfare Rights Organization, 426 
U.S. 26, 41,96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976)); 
and, (3) redressability- a "substantial 
likelihood" that the requested relief 
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will resolve the alleged injury. !d. 
at 1861-62. (quoting Simon at 45, 
96 S. Ct. at 1917)). The Court 
considered these factors to be 
essential to Article III's "case and 
controversy" requirement. !d. at 
1862. 
The Court explained that 
Steven's interest in the litigation, 
specifically his share of the proceeds 
of any recovery, provided Stevens 
with a "concrete private interest in the 
outcome of[the] suit." !d. (quoting 
Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). However, 
consistent with previous holdings, the 
Court found that the relator's interest 
in the recovery is not alone sufficient 
to justify standing. !d. at 1863. 
Instead, the Court turned to the theory 
that Stevens, the assignee of a claim, 
has standing to assert the injury in fact 
suffered by the assignor (the United 
States Government). !d. The Court 
found that in the case of the FCA, a 
partial assignment of the 
Government's damages claim is made 
to the relator, and thus standing is 
conferred to Stevens. !d. 
The Court continued and 
examined the longstanding history of 
such statutes. !d. As the Court found 
above, qui tam actions date back to 
l41h century English statutes that 
confirm the relator's standing 
requirement mandated by Article III. 
!d. at 1863-64. 
The Court then turned to the 
merits ofthe case: (1) the Agency's 
contention that a State is not a 
"person" subject to the FCA's qui tam 
provision, and (2) the Eleventh 
Amendment's barto suing a State. !d. 
at 1865. 
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To determine the definition of 
the term "person," the Court analyzed 
the FCA's text to determine the 
"longstanding interpretive presmnption 
that a 'person' does not include the 
sovereign." !d. at 1866. The Court 
found in the absence of an "affinnative 
showing oflegislative intent to the 
contrary," the term "person" does not 
include States for the purposes of qui 
tam liability. !d. at 1867. Subsequent 
amendments, in 1982 and 1986, 
support the Court's finding that 
Congress did not intend the word 
"person" to include States or state 
agencies. !d. at1868. In fact, the 
Court found that changes to the law 
present no evidence to suggest the 
term "person" included States. !d. 
Comparisons to terms defined 
contained in ensuing legislation 
suggested that States are not 
considered "persons." !d. In other 
acts Congress elected to define 
"person" and include State in the 
definition. !d. at 1869. The Court 
found that the absence of State in the 
false claim provision's definition of 
"person" is a further indication of the 
Legislature's intent to exclude States. 
Moreover, the Court found that 
qui tam liability is very punitive in 
nature, and thus, considering a State 
a "person" would contradict the 
"presumption against imposition of 
punitive damages on governmental 
entities." !d. (quoting Newport v. 
Fact Concerts, Inc., 435 U.S. 247, 
262-63 (1981)). 
Finally, the Court compared the 
term "person" in the FCA to the 
Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act 
of 1986 ("PFCRA"), an act creating 
administrative remedies for false 
claims. !d. at 1870. The PFCRA 
exempts States from liability for 
monetary damages. !d. Thus, the 
Court utilized the PFCRA's text to 
conclude that the intended meaning of 
"person" in the FCA exempts States 
as well. !d. 
Because the Agency was not 
deemed a "person" under the FCA, 
the Court declined to offer a ruling 
concerning the Eleventh Amendment 
immunity issue. !d. at 1859-60. 
However, the Court noted in dicta that 
a qui tam action against a State is in 
doubt as far as violating the Eleventh 
Amendment. !d. at 1860 (citing 
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 
348 (1936)). 
Justices Stevens and Souter 
dissented, opining, ''the 1986 amend-
ments also declare that a 'person' who 
could engage in a violation of 
§ 3729 --thereby triggering the civil 
investigative demand provision--
includes any State or political 
subdivision of a State." !d. at 1871 
(citing §6(a), 100 Stat. 3168 (codified 
at 31 U.S. C. § 3733(1)(1 )(A), (2), & 
(4) (Supp. 2000)). In contradiction to 
the majority, the dissenters believed 
the statutory text makes it clear that 
Congress intended to include States 
in the term "person." !d. 
The False Claims Act, originally 
enacted in 1863 and signed into law 
by President Lincoln, has returned 
more than $3 billion to the federal 
treasury from those who knowingly 
present false or fraudulent claims for 
payment. 2 Nearly every year the 
health care and defense industries 
lobby Congress to gut the False 
Claims Act or attempt to defeat the 
law in the courts. The Supreme 
Court's ruling adds validity to a 
very powerful and necessary 
instrument that prevents fraudulent 
activity. 
Although a private citizen may 
not sue a State or state agency in 
federal court under the law, the 
Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the False Claims 
Act by holding that a relator has 
standing to bring suit. By doing so, 
the Court has ensured the statute's 
future use by the federal government 
and relators. 
The term qui tam is Latin 
for "who as well for the King as for 
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